The 1998 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Convention asked the Committee on Theology and Church Relations (CTCR),
(Res. 3-15B), to provide "a study document to help the Church, on
the basis of the Word of God, make informed ethical judgments
concerning cloning and attendant issues." Christian Faith and
Human Beginnings represents the second part of the CTCR response
to this request. The first, What Child is This? Marriage, Family
and Human Cloning dealt with the issue of reproductive cloning.
Christian Faith and Human Beginnings seeks to focus on what
it calls pre-implantation human life. This designation refers to the
baby that has been conceived but has not yet been implanted in the
wall of the uterus.
This is an inadequate and confusing document that
misses the mark on two counts of its assignment. It does not help
the Church, because, on the whole, its argument is not based on the
Word of God. Instead of reporting, on the basis of clear Scripture
passages, and simple reason, that God creates each individual human
at the moment of conception, the report leaves an impression of
doubt. Instead of a clear "Thus saith the Lord" we end up with the
impression that the case is so weak that it ought to be taken before
the court of human wisdom. Most readers will be put off by the
language and structure of this report. The lack of the use of
Scripture and the dependence on philosophical categories, (e.g.
"Inherent Indicator Approaches" and "Relational/Historical
Approaches") will render this document of little help to most in
making "informed, ethical judgments."
The general tone of the document appears to give
credence to the arguments of those who do not believe that
pre-implantation human life should be protected. The first major
section of the report is entitled, "The Riddle of Human Life." The
use of the word riddle leaves an impression of uncertainty as
to when and how life begins. The authors seem overly concerned with
giving opponents of life their say. The report presents their
arguments but does not counter them.
"There is disagreement not only within
contemporary culture but also among Christians on questions about
where and how pre-implantation embryonic cells in laboratories
should be accorded protection rather than being discarded in clinics
or destroyed or compromised by research" (p. 7).
Such a statement—if not countered with a clear
statement of definitive answer, (which is not done)—will plant the
seed of doubt in the minds of the readers that will not be stricken
down by the rest of the report.
The authors repeatedly refer to "complexity and
uncertainty that surrounds current debate on the status of embryos"
(footnote 68). At times it sounds like the authors of the report are
uncertain whether or not the embryo ought to be protected.
"While we agree with those who maintain that
pre-implantation human life should be fully protected, we
acknowledge that the relative newness of our engagement with
pre-implantation human life and our consequent unfamiliarity with
embryonic life keep the arguments from achieving a character of
transparent obviousness" (p. 36).
The CTCR here declares that the Word of God does
not make the value of newly conceived human life obvious. This is
not helpful.
That being said, the conclusions of the report
are laudable in most cases. Although meekly stated, the Commission
does conclude "Upon examination, the Commission on Theology and
Church Relations has remained convinced that both biblical and
philosophical perspectives support the wisdom of protecting
pre-implantation embryos from the time of conception." (p. 10)
However, the arrival at and the presentation of
the arguments in this report leaves much to be desired. For example,
the first statement of the conclusion that pre-implantation embryos
ought to be protected is left to a footnote (4). It is not until
page 30 that they reveal their method of operation, (a forensic
method that will leave many Christians wondering "Where’s the
Scripture?"). They propose that since many "thoughtful Christians"
disagree on Scripture and science that we ought to adopt a "burden
of proof" approach to the argument. The argument runs like this:
-
Everyone agrees that God cares for human
life.
-
Since there is doubt whether pre-implantation
embryos are human in every degree the burden of proof lies with
those who would seek to destroy such embryos.
-
None of the arguments for destruction attain
the strength to bear the burden of proof.
-
Therefore, we ought to protect these lives
(p. 42).
We might reasonably expect a more forceful and
more theological argument from a Commission on Theology. This line
of reasoning appears to be adopted for the sake of dialogue with
those who disagree.
"We readily acknowledge the puzzling and complex
features of the issues we are addressing, and we offer this moral
guidance in a spirit of humility. We trust that our fairness in
weighing the competing arguments will be evident, and will elicit
equally fair responses from those whose weighing of the arguments
leads them to different conclusions" (p. 10).
This hidden agenda was not part of the original
charge given by the convention in Resolution 3-15B, but shapes the
entire report. This agenda is not helpful to the Church. The Church
is not looking for an opening salvo to a dialogue, but a clear
statement of God’s law.
Furthermore, this entire line of "burden of
proof" reasoning unravels at their own hand.
"As we noted above, people who reason this way
are implicitly claiming that the burden of proof lies on those of us
who oppose embryonic stem cell research and would deny potentially
life-saving therapies to people in need. They say that unless we can
provide convincing arguments in support of protecting
pre-implantation embryos, then we have not met the burden of proof
and the harvesting of stem cells from embryos should be permitted"
(p. 37).
The "burden of proof" argument cuts both ways and
the CTCR does not, cannot, answer this argument. It basically
eviscerates the entire document. Without reference to a clear Word
of God, this issue will remain "ambiguous." Any line of reasoning
based on ambiguity and subjective criteria ultimately places all
human life, regardless of age, in danger.
One more specific fault must be addressed. The
CTCR seems to be "puzzled" (p. 41) by the fact that in nature "sixty
percent" (p. 31) or up to "three quarters" (p. 25) of fertilized
eggs do not develop. They are unwilling to argue against those who
say that such loss indicates "that nature itself seems to relate to
pre-implantation human life differently than it does to implanted
life." The argument seems to be that since many of them die
naturally we are free to kill some of those that survive (p. 40).
It is difficult to see how a high percentage of
death in this, or any stage of life, can be used to argue concerning
the nature of that life. On the contrary, it demonstrates the
vulnerability of life at this stage, suggesting that it ought to be
carefully protected. This ultimately becomes a subjective argument.
At what percentage of loss in a certain population does the human
nature of a population come into question? Since the incidence of
death in human beings is 100 percent one might argue that we can
kill whomever we wish.
When the CTCR finally does get to examining
specific Scriptural passages it mitigates the force of those
passages with the familiar refrain that "not all Christians agree"
that these passages can be applied to the case of newly conceived
human life (p. 34). Once again the report returns to legalese by
suggesting that even though these passages may be debatable, the
Scripture reveals God’s care for human life, and that His care casts
"reasonable doubt" on the destruction of newly conceived human life
(p. 34).
In the end, the report argues that we should not
destroy these embryos (p. 44) and that in vitro fertilization ought
to take place only with the provision that all embryos be given a
chance to live (p. 47). For that we can be thankful, and hope that
some readers will be persistent and perceptive enough to dig this
conclusion out from under the dross that lies heavily about it.